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Abstract—We introduce a powerful recurrent neural network
based method for novelty detection to the application of detecting
radio anomalies. This approach holds promise in significantly
increasing the ability of naive anomaly detection to detect small
anomalies in highly complex complexity multi-user radio bands.
We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach on a number of
common real over the air radio communications bands of interest
and quantify detection performance in terms of probability of
detection an false alarm rates across a range of interference to
band power ratios and compare to baseline methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection is an important time-series function
which is widely used in network security monitoring, medical
sensor monitoring, financial change modeling, and any number
of other applications. There is a significant body of existing
work on the subject in theory and applications [4] [13], we
focus here primarily on reconstruction based novelty detec-
tion. In radio, applications of anomaly detection have been
discussed [7] but not widely used outside of a few small niche
applications.
Radio anomaly detection has been leveraged somewhat in
wireless sensor networks such as in [11] [8] [3] [9], but most
of these applications focus on detecting changes in sensor data
(temperature, pressure, etc), or expert features rather than on
anomalies occurring in the high rate raw physical layer radio
signal itself. We are unaware of any currently widely used or
investigated applications of naive anomaly detection within the
raw unmodified radio physical layer rather than on an expert
feature such as a detection statistic. The focus on raw RF rather
than a specialized statistic is based on the hope that such a
technique may be able to generalize well to numerous types
of signals, rather than relying on specific analysis to help a
single scenario.
There are a number of driving motivations for such a
capability; for instance for spectrum access enforcement by
regulatory bodies in which the appearance of new radio users
of any kind of emission on unauthorized bands or with
unauthorized equipment or techniques presents an enforcement
event which should be rapidly addressed. In commercial and
defense communications applications radio anomaly detection
also presents the opportunity to rapidly recognize interfering
emitters, malfunctioning equipment, or malicious users within
their licensed bands and take action. Each of these applications
currently requires expensive high maintenance expert systems
which often perform a series of steps of energy detection, lo-
calization, classification, and comparison to baseline databases,
and alerting with large amounts of specialization and tuning
to the band and signals of interest and taking significant com-
putational horsepower and implementation expense to deploy.
By shifting these systems to more generally applicable naive
methods using neural networks which can be highly optimized
on concurrent architectures such as graphics processing units
(GPUs) in a very general way, we offer the potential to make
such systems much easier to realize, adapt to new domains,
and run leveraging economies of scale on computing power
and model primitive optimization.
II. APPROACH
Recently, the use of recurrent neural networks to form
a predictive reconstruction as part of a novelty detector has
been proposed [17] and demonstrated to function quite well
on several time series datasets including electrocardiograms,
physical telemetry signals, and power consumption metrics.
In this work a long short term memory [2] (LSTM) based
recurrent network is used to train a time series predictor on a
training set which is then used to compute an expected error
distribution vs the real signal which is well characterized for
non-anomalous behavior. The sequence learning capacity of
LSTM has in some cases been shown to exceed that of Hid-
den Markov model [10] and Kalman based linear predictors,
because it is able to take into account a much more complex
nonlinear representation of state (does not make the Markov
assumption), short and long term transition dependencies, and
complex nonlinear output mapping dependencies than either of
these prior models are capable of. An overview of this system
level model is shown in figure 1.
In this case we consider a sampled radio data time series
X = {x1, x2, ..., xM}, our training support, where each point
is a complex base-band sample in R2. We train a predictor f
with learned parameters θ such that for any start offset k, input
samples count N , and prediction length `, we form a sequence
regression problem shown in equation 1.
{xˆk+N , ..., xˆk+N+`−1} = f ({xk, ..., xk+N−1, θNN ) (1)
This function f can take the form of any number of
different prediction methods, but in this case we evaluate a
recurrent neural network (RNN) based predictor leveraging
LSTM layers.
A predictor error vector can then be obtained on the
training set by computing the difference ei = xi− xˆi for each
predicted value given the known (non-causal) actual values of
x over [k + N, k + N + ` − 1]. This error vector is used to
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Fig. 1. Neural Radio Anomaly Detection System Model
estimate of distribution {e0, ..., e`−1} ∼ Pe(e(`), θE) through
some form of parametric or non-parametric density estima-
tion. In this case, we model using a parametric multivariate
Gaussian distribution.
After fitting both the predictive model parameters θNN
and the error distribution parameters θE on the dataset, we
can now use this model to perform novelty detection by
observing regions within the signal x(n) where predictor
error deviates significantly from the expected error distribution
De , p(e(`), θE). That is to say, we wish to compute
p(xi ∼ De).
This can be done by thresholding the log-likelihood of ei
in De at some level to make a decision, or by combining
V sequential samples of the likelihood and thresholding the
aggregate statistic. Our expression used looks roughly like that
given below in equation 2.
τ
H1
≷
H0
10 log10
V∏
v=0
p(e(`)v ) (2)
Here H1 is the hypothesis that the current values of
xi, ..., xi+N for each of the V observations are drawn from
a distribution matching that of our training set, representing
’normal’ behavior, while H0 is the hypothesis that the current
values of xi, ..., xi+N are not drawn from the distribution
of the training set, representing an anomaly or novelty being
present. Our threshold τ can be fit using an Fβ or typical
constant false alarm rate (CFAR) sorts of analysis [1] if a
decent dataset of ”anomalous” behavior is known, or a false
alarm rate on ”normal” behavior is used as the metric.
III. WIDE-BAND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS TIME-SERIES
Time-series in the radio domain are quite complex models,
especially when considering wideband aggregates of numerous
channels on separate frequencies, each with their own tem-
poral and spectral channel access scheme, and each carrying
whitened randomized data-bits which typically do not repeat
aside from reference tones such as preamble, low-entropy-
headers and pilots. A time sequence prediction model for such
an aggregate signal must then be able to account for short-time
expected symbol transitions and pulse shaping of a each carrier
and its channel variations as well as the symbols forming
higher level traffic and application sequences representing
behavior of users. At both layers we must be able to model the
sum of all users and emitters combined into a single shared
medium on one or more channels. Differing levels of predictor
complexity and predictive capacity define how many of these
effects of ’normal’ behavior are modeled, defining the scale,
complexity, or distance from the norm of the anomaly which
can be detected using that model.
Fig. 2. Spectrogram plots of excerpts from radio example sequences
In figure 2 we show spectrogram plots demonstrating a
variety of radio time-series complexities of real world signals
which we further consider in thi paper. Here we see examples
ranging from the most static, continuously modulated analog
FM broadcast carriers, through relatively well structured on
a macro-scale but extremely complexly coded and changing
on a micro-scale, cellular band carriers of both GSM and
LTE with its rapidly changing resource block (RBs) allo-
cations in OFDMA time-frequency slots, and finally to the
most chaotic ISM band environment comprised by CSMA/CD
WiFi/IEEE802.11 bursts occurring at random times, and fre-
quency hopped BlueTooth/IEEE802.15.1 bursts occurring at
random times and frequencies among other emitters.
Each of these bands presents different complexities which
a temporal sequence prediction model needs to capture to
accurately form a predictive model for signal behavior. We will
consider each of these examples while evaluating our anomaly
detection performance and train using these real recorded
over the air RF datasets including harsh urban channel fading
conditions. Recordings are conducted with an Ettus Research
B200-mini [6] which uses the Analog Devices AD9361 RFIC
front-end and stored to disk for analysis using GNU Radio [5].
IV. PREDICTOR MODELS
Here we describe each model f ({xk, ..., xk+N−1, θNN )
which we use to predict our next samples of the time-series
sequence. For fairness of comparison we normalize each pre-
dictor to 32 samples of input and 4 predicted output samples.
We include a several baseline models as well as a number
of models modeled after state of the art time series learning
neural network capabilities.
A. Kalman Sequence Predictor
We use a 3rd order Unscented Kalman Filter/Predictor
similar to that described in [12]. This is implemented using the
FilterPy module [18] and forms our performance benchmark
for this paper. This implements a traditional Kalman Novelty
Detector as one might do without a learned predictive model.
In this case the adaptive filter is tuned online while running
and the error distribution is characterized on this.
B. DNN Sequence Predictor
Fig. 3. DNN Predictor Network Architecture
In our Dense Neural Network (DNN) model (shown in
figure 3), we train a naive fully-connected network as a neural
network baseline with a high number of free parameters and
heavy dropout allowing it to learn a completely unconstrained
mapping between input and output samples. This will allow
us to compare other specialized/constrained architectures such
as convolutional and recurrent varieties for model fitting ap-
propriateness.
C. Raw LSTM Sequence Predictor
In the LSTM based sequence predictor model (Figure 4),
we implement a 2-layer LSTM followed by 2 fully connected
layers culminating in a linear activation for regression of com-
plex continuous valued sample output values. We regularize
between each layer with dropout of 0.5 and using proper
LSTM weight and activation dropout as described in [14] and
implemented in Keras [15].
D. DCNN1 Sequence Predictor
In the Dilated Convolutional Neural Network 1 (DCNN1)
(Figure 5), we introduce a simple dilated convolution layer on
the front end of a simple fully connected neural network to
allow for learning of convolutional features at a stride of 2.
Fig. 4. LSTMArchitecture used for evaluation recurrent neural prediction
network
Fig. 5. DCNN1 Predictor Network Architecture
Fig. 6. DCNN2 Predictor Network Architecture
E. DCNN2 Sequence Predictor
We model our Dilated Convolutional Neural Network
2 (DCNN2) architecture on a vastly simplified version of
Google’s WaveNet architecture [19] which has demonstrated a
strong ability to learn raw time series representations on acous-
tic voice data. Here we use two levels of dilated convolutions
where each is a residual block [16] containing identical layers
with hyperbolic tan (TanH) and sigmoid activations merged
multiplicatively, followed by a 1x1 convolutional layer for
dimensionality reduction.
V. MODEL OPTIMIZATION
Before evaluating detection performance, we simply at-
tempt to minimize the mean squared error of the predictor
function to select our network parameters θNN and our ar-
chitecture and hyper-parameters for the predictor. From initial
experimentation, optimal network architectures seem to vary
slightly from dataset to dataset, but for now we seek to use a
single set of network parameters for all datasets.
A much more extensive hyper-parameter search is really
desired here to find best suited network structures. We hope in
future work to do this more extensively, within the scope of
this work we only try a handful of architectures derived from
proven architectures in prior work on similar tasks.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate performance, we introduce a number of differ-
ent classes of synthetic anomalies into each recorded sampled
RF dataset and measure detection and false alarm rates using
various methods of novelty detection. Our anomaly types
considered here span the range of time-frequency support from
an instantaneous wide-band pulse, to a narrow-band tone at a
single frequency, but are each normalized by total power of
the same time support over the window [ts, te). The anomaly
classes considered are:
• Pulsed Complex Sinusoid: expressed as n(t) =
exp(j2pitFc/Fs) for t ∈ [ts, te) where Fc ∼
Uniform(−Fs/2, Fs/2).
• Short-time Broadband Bursts (Sinc pulse): expressed
as n(t) = sinc(2pi(t − (ts + te)/2)Fc/Fs) for t ∈
[ts, te).
• Brief Periods of Signal Non-Linear Compression: ap-
proximated as n(t) = 13x(t)− 3x3(t) for t ∈ [ts, te).
• Pulsed QPSK Signals: where symrate ∼
Uniform(Fs/250, Fs/2), Fc ∼ Uniform(−(Fs −
symrate/2)/2, (Fs − symrate/2)/2), and a root-
raised cosine pulse shaping filter of α = 0.3 and
N = 11 is applied at the baudrate.
• Pulsed Chirp Events: n(t) = exp(j2pitFc/Fs) for
t ∈ [ts, te) where Fc varies linearly in time
from Fc1 ∼ Uniform(−Fs/2, Fs/2) to Fc2 ∼
Uniform(−Fs/2, Fs/2)
Fig. 7. Example synthetic anomalies on the FM broadband dataset, from left
to right: compression, chirp, tone, qpsk, pulse
We characterize each of these anomalies by its interference-
to-band-power ratio (IBR) in dB. We refer to this in some
instances as signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for convenience but
the signal of interest here is the anomaly and the ”noise” in
this case is the power of the non-anomalous band including
all signals therein.
Inspecting figure 7 we can see that performance does vary
based on the anomaly type. For instance, performance on non-
linear compression, chirp detection, tone detection, and QPSK
burst detection, all appear to be quite a bit stronger in the
LLR detection metric than the wideband pulsed noise which
is very short in time and results in an anomaly spike which is
likewise extremely short in time. We include several runs of
bands below in figures 8, 9, and 10 for visual inspection.
Fig. 8. LSTM Anomaly Detector on FM Band
Fig. 9. LSTM Anomaly Detector on LTE Band
Fig. 10. LSTM Anomaly Detector on GSM Band
In figure 11 we show the performance of the tone detector
across 100,000 samples of FM recording inserting 50 random
Fig. 11. Probability of Detection and False Alarm for sinusoidal tones on
FM Broadcast Band
tone events of length 250 samples. As the IBR approaches
-5dB, we have nearly perfect Pd/Pfa performance, while in
figure 12, we see for the wideband pulse tone, which has very
large instantaneous peak power but a very narrow time-support,
the IBR does not have nearly as significant an impact on Pd/Pfa
performance at these IBR levels. In this case, our probability of
detection represents the probability of detecting all anomalies
present in the time range, while our probability of false alarm
represents the probability of a false alarm being triggered in
any 250-sample window.
Fig. 12. Probability of Detection and False Alarm for wide-band pulses on
FM Broadcast Band
We can repeat these experiments across a range of
interference-to-band power ratios to observe the efficacy in
a range of different modulation and multi-access schemes.
Results for this are shown below in figure 13. Here we can
see that for all channel types are relatively effective once we
approach 0-5dB IBR. The most difficult here is the ISM band,
where our predictive model is used to seeing bursty CSMA/CD
kinds of traffic from WiFi and blue-tooth frequency hopped
Fig. 13. Probability of Detection and False Alarm for Tones in each band
type
bursts across the band. In this case our anomaly detection
ability is the most challenged of all the other bands.
Fig. 14. Probability of Detection and False Alarm for Chirps in each band
type
Repeating this experiment with chirp interference instead
of pulse interference, we show performance in figure 14. Again
we see excellent performance above 0-5dB in most cases,
although the ISM band continues to be the most difficult.
To summarize these performance behaviors into a more
concise performance number, we fix a constant false alarm rate
for comparison of detection performance. In figure 15 we show
how detection performance varies across a range of constant
false alarm rates for the LTE band using the LSTM model.
By repeating this for all models on all band-types, we can
then pick a constant false alarm rate to compare performance
Fig. 15. LTE Detector Constant False Alarm Rate for LSTM Model
Fig. 16. Constant False Alarm Rate Comparison of Prediction Models
across our different models. Doing this allows us to compare
model performance in different types of emitter and channel
environments.
Looking at these results, we see that in most cases the
neural network based predictors outperform the Kalman based
predictors slightly. In the case of cellular networks, both
GSM and LTE where a much more regular and structured
temporal pattern on each carrier exists, we see slightly larger
improvements in performance, likely due to having better
learned a temporal predictive model suited to this behavior.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how the neural network
reconstruction-based anomaly detector can be used on several
real wideband over the air radio bands of interest to detect
anomalies occurring within band. The results have shown
that especially in structured radio signal environments where
temporal sequence model prediction performs best, we obtain
our best performance advantage over Kalman novelty detector
methods.
We believe this is an important result that shows viability
of this form of spectrum change monitoring and provides some
starting points for improvements on more traditional methods
for time series change detection. We have evaluated several
neural predictor models and have shown that both the LSTM
model and potentially the DCNN model are viable at low SNR
levels, while for an analog modulation (FM Broadcast), there
was less difference between the performance of the detectors
with these candidate networks.
In future work we hope to perform much more extensive
architecture and hyper-parameter searches, evaluate longer
runs, larger datasets and additional types of anomalies and
mixtures of anomalies. We would like to evaluate hybrid
architectures such as the LSTM with convolutional features on
the front end, including both the use of dilated convolutional
layers and residual units combining a number of the promising
techniques which have largely been evaluated separately here.
In the area of spectrum sensing for communications system
failure, interference, security, or monitoring, we hope that
this method helps imagine a promising path forward towards
general learning of non-signal and non-band specific methods
which can be used rapidly on a wide range of systems and
deployment models without needing specialized expert prior
knowledge of the system of interest.
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